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of Article 85
Ben Van Houtte*
In this article, Mr. Van Houtte outlines the basicprovisionsfor antitrust
enforcement in the European Economic Community, and comments on the
current standards utilized by the European Commission in application of
these laws. He advocates movement toward a more equalized balance of the
theory behind the antitrust laws and adequate enforcement of those pro vi-
sions. To achieve that balance, Mr. Van Houtte favors the use of a "stan-
dard of reason" in Article 85() cases, and increased emphasis on thepublic
interest in analyses petfonmed under Article 85(3).
It is not surprising that in this time of economic turmoil antitrust
enforcement in the European Economic Community (EEC) has come
under attack. The European Parliament recently called upon the Com-
mission to apply competition rules "discerningly,"' taking into account
the principle that in this period of recession competition should not be
an end in itself. The Economic and Social Committee has acknowl-
edged the "need to reconcile competition and cooperation,"'2 and has
* Attorney, Brussels; J.D., Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1978; LL.M., Northwestern
University, 1980.
I Competitlo" Parliament Callsfor Broader EEC Competition Policy, EUROPE AGENCE IN-
TERNATIONALE D'INFOMATION POUR LA PRESSE (No. 3132) (n.s.) 9, 9-10 (May 6, 1981); Compe-
ttorn Moreau Report Calls for Enlargement and Deepening of EEC Competition Policy, EURoPE
AaENCE INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE (No. 3130) (ns.) 14 (May 1, 1981);
Competition" The Economic and Social Committee Callsfor an EEC Competition PolicyAdaptedto
the Present Period of Crisis and Economic Change, EUROPE AGENCE INTERNATIONALE
D'INFoRmATiON POUR LA PRESSE (No. 3130) (ns.) 15 (May 1, 1981).
2 Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Community Competition Policy in the
Light of the Current Economic and Social Situation, at 8, Doc. IND/116 Competition Policy
(Apr. 30, 1981).
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suggested that "persistent inflation, rising unemployment and the nu-
merous effects of the energy crisis" should moderate competition pol-
icy.3 The Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
urges that competition policy "should not be treated as an objective in
isolation but as one of a number of interrelated Community policies,
notably in the fields of commercial and industrial policy."4 Moreover,
it has criticized the Commission's failure to consider competition policy
in the wider context of other community policies.5 In addition, it has
objected to "the lack of legal certainty as to the status of notified new
agreements," and has called upon the Commission to examine "ways of
expediting procedures for granting exemptions"'6 which will provide
needed certainty.
This article is intended to show that recent Court of Justice deci-
sions permit the Commission to follow these recommendations of the
European Parliament.7 Indeed, the Commission has already followed
them in the areas of selective distribution and exclusive purchasing
agreements. This liberal application of Article 85(l) of the EEC
Treaty, which accounts for considerations beyond competition, will
make the troublesome Article 85(3) exemption procedure unnecessary
in some circumstances. Finally, this article will discuss the feasibility
of balancing competition policy with other policies in Article 85(3)
analysis.'
I. A STANDARD OF REASON IN ARTICLE 85(l)
A. Emergence of a Standard of Reason
The European Commission has long analyzed agreements which
may restrict competition, in terms of the impact they have on freedom
of choice, when determining whether such agreements violate Article
85(l). 9 In National Sulphuric 4cidAssociation,'° for example, a buying
3 Id. at 11-12.
4 1981-82 EuR. PaR.. Doc. (No. 689) 5 (1981).
5 Id. at 35.
6 Id. at 11, 33.
7 FEDETAB, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, [19811 Comm Mkt. L.R. 134; Metro v. Com-
mission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RFa'.
(CCH) 8435.
8 This understanding of Article 85(1) and (3) constitutes an introduction of reason into the
reading of these provisions which is similar to the "rule of reason" applied by United States courts
in the interpretation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
9 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, enteredinforce Jan. 1, 1958, art.
85, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
Article 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market. all agree-
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pool involving the largest United Kingdom sulphur users was held to
restrict competition because its members had entered an agreement de-
priving them of the choice of negotiating terms and conditions with
each supplier individually." In Industrieverband Soinhofener Natur-
steinplatten,12 the Commission held that price fixing among manufac-
turers of natural stone restricted competition because the price
agreement limited the business freedom of the member manufacturers
and their dealers, and thus substantially restricted the scope of choice
of the ultimate customers. 13 Similarly, freedom of choice may be ille-
galy restricted in vertical agreements which establish an exclusive rela-
tionship between a manufacturer and a dealer. In Hennessy-Henkell,
14
an exclusive distribution agreement between a French cognac manu-
facturer and a German dealer was held to restrict competition, because
the agreement foreclosed other German dealers from choosing to
purchase from the manufacturer, and because the dealer involved
could not purchase the product from other French sources.15
The main purpose of Article 85(1), as applied under the freedom
of choice standard, is thus to protect the business freedom of parties
and non-parties to any business agreement. The standard cannot be
strictly applied, however, because all agreements restrict freedom of
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted prac-
tices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of sup-
plementary obligations which, by their nature of according to commercial usage, have no
connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically
void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of any
agreement or category of agreements between undertakings; any decision or category of deci-
sions by associations of undertakings; any concerted practice or category of concerted prac-
tices; which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to
the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
10 23 OJ. EuR. CoM.s (No. L 260) 24 (1980), [19811 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429.
11 d. at 28, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 437.
12 23 OJ. EUn. COML. (No. L 318) 32 (1980), [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 308.
13 -d. at 35, [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 315.
14 23 OJ. EuR. CoMM. (No. L 383) 11 (1980), [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. LR. 601.
15 Id. at 14, [1981] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 607.
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choice and would be held to violate Article 85(1). Indeed, it is the
essence of agreement that parties undertake obligations to each other
which restrict their freedom of choice. Even a simple sale restricts the
parties' business freedom: by purchasing from one seller, the purchaser
becomes unable to make the same purchase from another seller. Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Justice and the Commission have developed
two limitations to the Article 85(1) freedom of choice standard.
1 6
First, if it is shown that in the absence of a particular restriction of
competition the particular trade could not take place at all, the restric-
tion is not contrary to Article 85(1). For example, absolute territorial
protection is usually a cardinal sin in EEC competition law. But if ter-
ritorial protection is the only way for a manufacturer to penetrate a
market, the protection will not be held to violate Article 85(1).17 Sec-
ond, both tribunals have followed the old adage "de minimis non curat
praetor :" courts should not be bothered with insignificant problems.
This de minimis rule was introduced to EEC competition law in Ve0lk v.
Vervaecke, t8 where the Court held that any agreement, even one con-
ferring absolute territorial protection, can escape the prohibition of Ar-
ticle 85(1) if the market power of the parties is so weak that competition
will not be significantly restricted.19 In addition to the standard of free-
dom of choice, including the two limits noted above, there are further
rules governing Commission decisions in the specific areas of selective
distribution20 and exclusive purchasing agreements.21 As will be dis-
cussed below, these additional rules may be characterized as a manifes-
tation of a rule of reason in Article 85(1) analysis.22
16 A significant limitation on all antitrust cases brought in the EEC is rooted in the text of
Article 85(1), which provides that it applies only to trade between Member States. The text of
Article 85(1) is reprinted supra at note 9. Other trade is subject only to local statutes and national
enforcement. See Hugin v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1869, 1899, [1978-1979
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8524, at 7459. In addition, the Court of Justice
and the Commission have established two more limitations without explicit textual basis. See
Opinion of Advocate General Warner, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, 158, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8439, at 7930.
17 Soci6t6 Technique Mini6re v. Maschinenbau Ulm, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 250-51,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8047, at 7696-97.
18 Vdlk v. Vervaecke, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8074.
19 Id. at 302-03, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 8086-87.
20 See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
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1. Selective Distribution Systems
A selective distribution system23 consists of a coordinated network
of dealers who must meet certain conditions imposed by the manufac-
turer. Usually, the manufacturer sells only to those dealers who agree
not to sell outside the network. In Metro v. Commission,24 the Euro-
pean Court of Justice held that Article 85(1) permits such distribution
systems, provided that manufacturers select their dealers "on the basis
of objective criteria of a qualitative nature relating to the technical
qualifications of the reseller and his staff and the suitability of his trad-
ing premises," and provided that such criteria are not applied in a dis-
criminatory fashion.25 The Metro decision, which upheld Commission
practice,2 6 is surprising because selective distribution systems inher-
ently impair business freedom of choice. Dealers who are part of a
distribution network surrender to the manufacturer their freedom to
determine merchandising methods independently, and dealers not part
of the network are denied the choice of purchasing from that manufac-
turer or the participating dealers.
This deviation from the standard of business freedom is not ex-
plained by either of the two established limitations27 on the standard.
The Court approved the selective distribution system in Metro because
it did not reduce "the degree of competition necessary to ensure the
observance of the basic requirements and the attainment of the objec-
tives of the Treaty,"28 or threaten the formation of a single market.29
The Court stated that this degree of competition may vary with the
product and economic structure of the relevant market in question.
The Court concluded that, because the relevant market in Metro con-
sisted of high quality, technically advanced audio equipment,30 and be-
cause readily interchangeable products were available to consumers
through other distribution channels,3 1 the selective distribution system
merely comprised one of several distribution channels adapted to the
peculiar characteristics of the producers and to the needs of consum-
23 Selective distribution systems are similar to the American concept of franchising.
24 Metro v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) % 8435.
25 Id. at 1904, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) at 7850.
26 Id.
27 See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
28 Metro v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1904, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]





International Law & Business 4:497(1982)
ers. 32 The Court's emphasis on the availability of interchangeable
products suggests that it thought the system had little impact on compe-
tition and that the decision turned on the de minimis rule. However,
this interpretation does not account for the Court's emphasis on the
technologically advanced nature of the audio products. Also, the de
minimis rule does not explain why the legality of the selective distribu-
tion system depended on whether manufacturers chose their dealers on
objective, nondiscriminatory criteria,33 because the de minimis rule ap-
plies without regard to the content of the agreement.34 Moreover, in
later cases the Court has not emphasized the availability of inter-
changeable products from channels other than selective distribution. It
has implied that as long as admission to a selective distribution system
is subject to objective, qualitative criteria, the distribution does not vio-
late Article 85(1), even if several such systems exist in the same mar-
ket.35 The Court implied this without referring to the de minimis rule,
which would not excuse the cumulative restrictive effects which several
small selective distribution systems together might cause.
36
This deviation from business freedom as the test under Article
85(1) has been characterized as a rule of reason.37 The rule of reason
weighs the outsider's interest in easy access to the manufacturer's sell-
ing network, the manufacturer's interest in commercial goodwill, the
dealer's interest in maintaining prices and the consumer's interest in
easily available high quality products at low prices. The Metro court
protected the outsider's interest by requiring manufacturers to use only
qualitative, objective, nondiscriminatory criteria in choosing dealers,
while protecting the consumer's interest by insisting on intra-brand
competition: dealers must be free to sell to other dealers within the
selective distribution system in order to decrease price differences be-
tween geographic markets.38 While the outsider's interests are best pro-
tected by free access to the network and maximum competition, the
32 Id.
33 See supra text accompanying note 9.
34 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
35 L'Or6al v. DeNieuwe, 1980 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 3775, 3790-92, 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 1 8715, at 8607-08; Lanc~me v. Etos, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511,2536-37, 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8714, at 8593-94.
36 De Nore v. Brouwerij Concordia, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 65, 91, [1976 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 18386, at 7940; Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin, 1967 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 407, 416, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8053, at 7804-05.
37 Salzman, Analogies Between United States and Common Market Antitrust Law in the Field of
Distribution, 13 INT'L LAW. 47, 64 (1979); Note, Metro v. Comm'n, 1978 SOCLAAL-ECONOMISCHE
WETOEVING [S.E.W.] 410, 425.
38 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 18
(1980).
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manufacturer's interests may not be well served by the presence of
these factors. For example, if a product is expensive and technologi-
cally advanced, and requires service before or after sale, the manufac-
turer may prefer to retain control over its distribution system so that
only highly qualified dealers will handle the product.39 The Metro de-
cision satisfies this interest by allowing manufacturers to develop selec-
tive distribution systems which meet the stated requirements, despite
the inevitable restriction of competition. It is not clear, however, how
much weight the Court gives to consumer interests. The Court merely
notes in passing that a specialized distribution channel is in the interest
of consumers.' The Court's insistence on intra-brand competition
within the distribution channel is presumably intended to benefit con-
sumers, but it is doubtful that consumers' interests are served when
products can be purchased only from approved dealers, who will usu-
ally employ a more expensive selling apparatus than would be the case
in an openly competitive market. A plausible argument can be made
that at least some consumers would prefer a completely competitive
distribution system permitting them to buy products "off the shelf" at
the lowest possible prices.
Regardless of whether insistence on intra-brand competition ade-
quately protects consumers, it is clear from the Court's approval of se-
lective distribution systems that it gave more weight to the interests of
manufacturers than to either consumers or excluded dealers. Until the
Court adopted the standard of reason analysis, manufacturers could
confidently establish selective distribution systems only by obtaining an
exemption under Article 85(3), because it was clear that such an ar-
rangement would necessarily restrict the freedom of choice of both con-
sumers and excluded dealers. Only under the balancing of a new
standard of reason, giving increased weight to the manufacturers' inter-
ests within the framework of Article 85(1), could selective distribution
systems be upheld without resort to Article 85(3).
41
39 See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic 4pproach: Reections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 6 (1977-78). Here Posner shows that a manufacturer may want to
restrict competition in the distribution of its product in order to evoke the optimal level of dealer
presale services, thus avoiding "free riding" dealers (those who provide no, or fewer, presale serv-
ices). He argues that the free rider concept played a role in the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Continental T.V. v.G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). It can be argued that the free
rider concept played a similar role in the European Court of Justice's decision in Metro.
40 Metro v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1905, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. ReP. (CCH) 8435, at 7850.
41 For a discussion of arguments supporting a rule of reason in Article 85 cases, see infra notes
55-64 and accompanying text.
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2. Exclusive Purchasing Agreements
The standard of reason has also been employed in the area of ex-
clusive purchasing agreements. One would assume that exclusive
purchasing agreements, by which a firm agrees to purchase all its re-
quirements from a single supplier, always restrict competition improp-
erly, because they restrict the purchaser's freedom of choice to obtain
supplies from other sources.42 Several recent cases, however, suggest
that the Commission has taken a different position. In its leading case
in this area, BP Kemi,43 the Commission correctly stated that exclusive
purchasing agreements necessarily foreclose other manufacturers from
supplying the customer party to the agreement, 4 but surprisingly did
not conclude that Article 85(1) was violated. Instead, it stated:
"Depending inter alia, on the length of the period and on the economic
context, including the market shares and positions of the purchaser and
seller such a purchasing obligation may constitute a restriction on com-
petition within the meaning of Article 85(l).14 1 The Commission rea-
soned that, regardless of whether competition is restricted after
implementation of the agreement, the competition to conclude an ex-
clusive purchasing agreement is not restricted because all interested
suppliers are free to make offers, and the purchaser is free to choose his
exclusive supplier from among them.46 However, the Commission im-
plies that while short-term agreements do not violate Article 85(1) for
this reason, long-term exclusive purchasing agreements may illegally
restrict competition because they deprive new suppliers (and old sup-
pliers who may have recently developed new efficiencies) of opportuni-
ties to compete for exclusive purchasing orders.47
Because long-term and short-term exclusive purchasing agree-
ments are distinguished on the basis of their effect on competition, the
Commission's holding may seem to be an application of the de minimis
rule. Indeed, the Commission's Seventh Report on Competition Policy
48
stated that Article 85(1) generally permits exclusive purchasing agree-
ments if they do not appreciably reduce competition-an explicit appli-
42 See Hennessy-Henkell, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 318) 32 (1980), [1981] 2 Comm. Mkt
L.R. 308.
43 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 32 (1979), [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.&. 684.
44 Id. at 40-41, [1979] 3 E. Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 699.
45 Id. (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 41, [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 699.
47 Id., [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 699-700.
48 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES CoMMIssIoN, SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
(1978).
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cation of the de minimis rule.49 The BP Kemi case, however, is not the
result of this rule alone. In what is still the present statement of the law
with respect to exclusive purchasing agreements, the Commission in BP
Kemi gave the following guidelines:
When [in a market] which already displays a weak competitive structure,
one of the most important suppliers enters into long-term contracts with
one of the most important purchasers, which induce the purchaser to take
all his requirements or the major part of his requirements from the same
supplier, there exists an appreciable disadvantage for the supplier's com-
petitors and for purchasers, and there is thus a restriction of competition
for the purposes of Article 85(1). A six-year agreement certainly goes
beyond what is appropriate under EEC rules of competition to the nature of
the legal and economic relationship between the parties. Certainly [thepur-
chaser's] interest in a regular guaranteed supply is to be recognized, as is
[the supplier's] interest in lasting and steady sales of its output. But these
interests could be met by concluding purchasing agreements stipulating
fixed quantities ... [and] such agreements could be regularly renewed
after renegotiating to adapt them to changing interests and the shifting
competitive position.
0
Although the Commission recognized the parties' interests in a
long-term supply arrangement, it held them insufficient because it con-
cluded that the same interests could be met by short-term sales agree-
ments, which restrict competition less.51 Thus, the Commission did
more than merely examine the impact of the agreement on the market,
which is all the de minimis rule requires. It judged the agreement by
weighing the business justifications for the agreement and the interests
of the parties involved. 2
This practice of weighing the interests of the parties is also found
in the Cane Sugar Supply Agreements decision. 3 The Commission
held that the purchasing agreements under review did not violate Arti-
cle 85(1) because the arrangements did not restrict competition "beyond
the normal commercial obligations of sellers and buyers to each other
contained in this type of long-term contract."'54 The case is unique be-
cause of the EEC's preferential treatment of the developing nations
which were involved and because the agreements at issue were not
49 Id. at 23.
50 22 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 286) 32, 42-43 (1979), [1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 684, 702-03
(emphasis added).
51 It is important to note, however, that single-term sales agreements may not be a practical
alternative.
52 Especially if the purchaser's market is highly concentrated, it is unlikely that a supplier
would be willing to invest heavily in manufacturing facilities unless he is certain of being able to
market his product.
53 23 OJ. EuR. Comm. (No. L 39) 64 (1980), [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 559.
54 Id. at 70, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 570 (emphasis added).
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strictly exclusive. However, the reference to "normal commercial obli-
gations" of sellers and buyers to each other suggests that the Commis-
sion does not apply the same freedom of choice standard to purchasing
agreements that it applies to most other agreements. Instead, parties
may conclude agreements which restrict business freedom without vio-
lating Article 85(1), provided the restriction is "normal."
3. Further Indications of a Rule of Reason
In areas other than selective distribution and exclusive purchasing,
the recent Commission decisions contain additional isolated references
to the parties' interests. In Floral,55 for example, the Commission re-
viewed a common sales agency arrangement established by French
manufacturers to coordinate their exports to Germany. The Commis-
sion held that the arrangement violated Article 85(1) because "the com-
petitive intentions of the three French manufacturers are ...
geographically confined by means of action concerted in advance with-
out their sicj being any real economic constraints militating in favour of
this."56 If legality of the agreement turned only on whether the busi-
ness freedom of the parties or third parties was restricted, there would
have been no need to investigate whether any economic constraints jus-
tified the practice at issue.
In Reuter,57 the Commission decided that the sale of a business
and an ancillary non-competition clause did not violate Article 85(1).
The Commission implied that such a sales agreement is "generally rec-
ognized as legitimate," 8 a normal practice which apparently does not
violate Article 85(1) even though it eliminates a competitor from the
market. A reasonable non-competition clause is likewise justified
under Article 85(1) since it is necessary to protect the interests of the
purchaser, though it obviously restricts competition.59 In Distillers- Vic-
tuallers,6" the Commission addressed a resale agreement governing the
sale of whiskey for tax- and duty-free consumption. The dealers ("vic-
tuallers") were forbidden to sell to customers who sell or consume
products on which taxes must be paid. Even though this agreement
primafacie restricted the victuallers' business freedom, the Commis-
sion held the agreement legal because "these are customers who would
55 23 OJ. EuR. COMM. (No. L 39) 51 (1980), [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 285.
56 Id. at 56, [1980] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 295 (emphasis added).
57 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 254) 40 (1976), [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D44.
58 Id. at 46, [1976] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D56.
59 Id.
60 23 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 233) 43 (1980), [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 244.
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not normally be supplied by the victualler or his customers. 61
Finally, in Krups,62 the Commission examined an obligation im-
posed by the manufacturer on its appointed dealers to keep adequate
stocks of its products. The Commission found this was not an illegally
restrictive obligation when imposed on wholesalers, because "this obli-
gation is part of their normal job of supplying the retail trade.
63
The cases discussed above show that the Court and the Commis-
sion have increasingly deviated from the usual test for violation of Arti-
cle 85(1): whether business freedom is restricted in more than a de
minimis way. The Commission is reluctant to strike down practices for
which the parties have valid economic justifications, and which can,
therefore, be deemed "normal" in the sense that any firm in the same
situation would reasonably be expected to act similarly. Thus, the new
rule of reason analysis inquires as to whether the parties had normal
economic interests in imposing primafacie anticompetitive restrictions
and whether these interests outweigh the burdens imposed on the re-
stricted parties.
The tendency to apply the standard of reason analysis is firmly
established in the areas of selective distribution and exclusive purchas-
ing agreements.64 This rule of reason also may be applied in some
other areas of antitrust law, possibly requiring major changes in the
Commission's philosophy with respect to exclusive relationships.
B. Advantages of a Standard of Reason in Article 85(1)
Council Regulation 17,65 which divides the task of enforcing EEC
antitrust laws between the Commission and the courts of Member
States, empowers only the Commission to grant an exemption pursuant
to Article 85(3) for agreements which violate Article 85(1). The exemp-
tion procedure requires that the parties notify the Commission of their
agreement and request an exemption. However, the Commission has
61 Id. at 44, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 247.
62 23 OJ. EuR. Comm. (No. L 120) 26 (1980), [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 274.
63 Id. at 28, [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 277.
64 It can be argued that this development is supported by the text of Article 85(1) itself. Arti-
cle 85(1) lists certain practices it deems to be illegally restrictive, one of which is making "the
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations
which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts:' EEC Treaty, art. 85(1)(e), supra note 9. Although there is hardly any case law
pertaining to this prohibition of tying, it appears that the drafters of the EEC Treaty did not wish
to prohibit "normal" business restrictions. Rather, they intended that the interests of the parties
involved should be weighed.
65 EEC Councih Regulation No. 17: First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty, J.0. Comm. EuR. (No. 13) 204 (1962), O.. EuL Comm. 87 (Spec. Ed. 1959-62).
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so many notifications pending that there is a backlog of several years.
Indeed, formal Commission responses to notifications are very rare,66
and consequently firms are denied the certainty they may need to im-
plement their agreements.
This problem is compounded by the danger that, while a notifica-
tion is pending, a national court may find the agreement illegal. If a
national court is called upon to apply Article 85(1) to an agreement, it
must do so even if the parties have notified the Commission and an
exemption request is pending.67 Because national courts are not em-
powered to grant exemptions, and because the restriction of competi-
tion test is usually strictly applied, the national court will usually find
the agreement illegal and may even award damages." It is little com-
fort that the Commission may eventually reverse the national court and
grant an exemption.
69
This unbearable situation is partly remedied by the institution of
the group exemption, in which the Commission grants exemption
under Article 85(3) for all agreements which fulfill strict conditions it
establishes concerning content of the agreement and market power of
the parties."° National courts are empowered to determine whether a
particular agreement satisfies the conditions of the group exemption,
even if the Commission was not notified of the agreement. A large
number of agreements, however, are not covered by the group exemp-
tions, either because the Commission has established no applicable
group exemption or because the parties are unwilling or unable to enter
66 In 1981, the Commission took only 11 decisions applying Articles 85 and 86. In the same
year, 185 new notifications were made. At the end of the year, 3,882 notifications were pending.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 51 (1982).
67 Belgian Radio & Television v. SABAM, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51, 63, [1974] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 238, 271.
68 Opinion of Advocate General Mayras, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 65, 101, [1977] 1 Com.
Mkt. L.R. 378, 387. See generally Faull & Weiler, Conflicts of Resolution in European Competition
Law, 3 EUR. L. REV. 116 (1978); Steindorff, Europaisches Kartellrecht und Staatenpraxis, 142
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRTsCHAFTsRECHT 525 (1978).
In order to avoid these contradictory holdings, some have suggested that the national court
should stay its proceedings until the Commission decides whether to grant an exemption. A dif-
ferent opinion, however, is that the national court should stay its proceedings as to "old agree-
ments," i.e., agreements existing before the implementation of Article 85 by Regulation 17, but
should proceed as usual when considering "new agreements."
69 The Commission is aware of the problems created by its backlog, and intends to speed up
its procedure. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 27 (1982).
70 Reg. 67/67, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 57) 849 (1967), provides for a group exemption of
exclusive dealing agreements. Reg. 2779/72, 15 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 338) 14 (1977), provides
for a group exemption of specialization agreements.
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an agreement which complies with the strict conditions the group ex-
emptions impose.
It is with regard to agreements not covered by group exemptions
that a standard of reason under Article 85(1) is most greatly needed.
Without it, there remains a great risk that national courts would hold
such agreements to be void and unenforceable.7 1 An application of
Article 85(1) which accounts for the interests of the parties would sub-
stantially reduce the Commission's backlog of exemption requests and
the resulting uncertainty for business planners, both by making fewer
agreements unlawful under Article 85(1) and by reducing the need to
request exemptions.
One could object that this approach enhances the power of na-
tional courts to shape competition policy and thereby hinders uniform
application of EEC antitrust law as decided by its main policy making
body, the Commission. One could also object that introducing a rule of
reason into Article 85(1) analysis decreases the effectiveness of the
Commission's sanction of refusing to consider an application for ex-
emption of an agreement restricting competition of which the Commis-
sion is not notified.
Although these objections are warranted, they do not outweigh the
risk firms incur that their agreements may needlessly be declared void
by a national court. Even though some uncertainty in antitrust law is
unavoidable, and may even be desirable,72 this uncertainty should be
minimized. Second, there is no reason to doubt that national courts of
Member States are capable of enforcing Article 85(1) effectively. Some
Member States, such as Germany, already possess a tradition of enforc-
ing national antitrust laws. Provided the general awareness and knowl-
edge of EEC antitrust law is increased, national courts will be able to
apply Article 85(1) satisfactorily. Third, uniformity of enforcement
would still be guaranteed by requests for preliminary rulings on ques-
tions of law, which is how the European Court of Justice ensures that
Article 85(1) is uniformly applied. Finally, it is probable that such an
application of Article 85(1) will relieve the Commission of its backlog,
speeding up the exemption procedure, providing more legal certainty to
businesses, and thereby possibly decreasing the reluctance of many
firms to notify the Commission of their agreements. Introducing a
71 See Korah, Comfort-Lefters-Reflections on the Peifume Cases, 6 EUR. L. REv. 14 (1981);
Van Bae, EECAntitrust Enforcement andAdjudication as seen by Defense Counsel, REVUE SUISE
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA CONCURRENCE 1 (1977).
72 Ferry, The Repose of Certainty and the Necessity of Uncertainty, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-
TRUST, FIFTH ANNUAL FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 1 (1978).
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standard of reason to Article 85(1) could thus provide for more, instead
of less, effective antitrust enforcement.
II. A STANDARD OF REASON IN ARTICLE 85(3)
Article 85(3) provides for exemption from Article 85(1) liability of
an agreement which:
(a) "contributes to improving the production or distribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress;"
(b) allows "consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit;"
(c) does not "impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; and"
(d) does not "afford such undertakings the possibility of elimi-
nating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.
7 3
Because condition (a) is positive, stating a goal to be achieved,
while the other three conditions are negative, stating effects to be
avoided,74 condition (a) is of particular importance. Consequently, it is
essential to consider the meaning of the requirement that the agreement
must contribute "to improving the production or digtribution of
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress." The determi-
nation of which arguments are relevant to Article 85(3) exemption de-
pends on how the Commission interprets this requirement.
In most cases in which exemptions have been granted, the Com-
mission concluded that condition (a) was met because either produc-
tion or distribution was improved.75 Specialization and other forms of
cooperation between competitors often improve production76 by lower-
ing production costs, increasing quality and facilitating development of
new products. Vertical agreements often lead to improvements in dis-
tribution,77 such as lower distribution costs and increased availability
of products. The common feature of these production and distribution
73 In FEDET4B, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, 3275-76, [19811 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 134,
245, the Court broke down Article 85(3) into these four conditions. The language comes from
Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty, supra note 9.
74 Although the second condition is phrased in a positive way, apparently requiring active
consumer participation in the benefits which result from the restrictive agreement, it is applied in a
negative manner- the Commission usually considers it to be satisfied when competition has not
been eliminated, because the pressure of competition is presumed to lead the parties to the agree-
ment to pass on at least part of the benefits to consumers. See, eg., National Sulphuric Acid
Ass'n, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 260) 24, 30 (1980), [1980] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429, 440.
75 See, e.g., Re Campari, 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1978); Re the Jaz-Peter Agree-
ment, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 17 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder New Developments]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,013.
76 Re the Jaz-Peter Agreement, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 17 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer
Binder New Developments] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,013.
77 Re Campari, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1978).
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improvements is that they benefit mainly the users of the product to
which the exempted agreement pertains, because distribution and pro-
duction are activities which are undertaken to satisfy the customers'
demand.
In a few cases, the Commission has granted an exemption on the
ground that technical or economic progress is promoted. Technical
progress often results from joint research and development, and from
license agreements which facilitate the development and marketing of
technologically advanced products? The Commission has only rarely
found, however, that an agreement promotes economic progress,79 and
when it has, the Commission also found other benefits, such as im-
provement of production or technical progress.
Thus, both technical and economic progress are, in the Commis-
sion's view, closely related to the purpose of the agreement and the
consumers of the product involved. Apparently, the Commission has
decided that "technical or economic progress" refers only to benefits
accruing to users of the products. The only arguments to which the
Commission is receptive are those that emphasize the benefits to cus-
tomers of the parties to a restrictive agreement.80
Parties to an agreement restricting competition may wish to argue
that their agreement benefits the economy as a whole, if not users of
their products. Members of a crisis cartel,8 ' for example, might claim
that an agreement gradually to decrease industry production according
to a predetermined plan is necessary to maintain maximum employ-
ment.82 The members of another industry may need to agree unani-
mously to install pollution control or energy saving devices in order to
prevent a dissenter from gaining a cost advantage and underpricing
participating firms. Finally, an industry could try to justify an agree-
ment among its members to reduce production on the grounds that re-
78 See, e.g., Re the Beecham/Parke Davis Agreement, 22 O.. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 11
(1979), [1979] 1 Comm. MkL L.R. 157.
79 See, ag., Re CECIMO, 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 11) 16 (1979), [1979] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 419.
80 The second condition, providing for consumer participation in the resulting benefit, has
been incorporated into the first.
81 In certain industries, for example, steel or man-made fibers, there is a lasting surplus pro-
duction capacity of major proportions. In order to recoup at least part of the very high fixed costs
and to keep their plants running, producers in such industries tend to sell at a loss. The purpose of
a crisis cartel is to solve this problem by an industry-wide cut-back of production, which would
result in a profitable price level. The alternative for this joint approach is that producers who do
not have the financing capacity to sustain these losses will go bankrupt, resulting in
unemployment.
82 See, eg., EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COMMISSION, EIGHTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POL-
icy 49-50 (1979).
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duction is necessary to facilitate imports from developing nations.83
These kinds of agreements harm rather than benefit the customers of
the parties involved because each agreement imposes an additional cost
on manufacturers which would probably be passed on to consumers.
In each of those agreements, however, the Community gains higher
employment, reduced pollution, saved energy or greater imports.
These public interest arguments, which support exemption of restric-
tions of competition under Article 85(3) on the grounds that the Com-
munity would benefit, even if certain consumers would not, may
influence the Commission's decision whether to investigate an agree-
ment or to publish the investigative findings, but the reported cases
clearly indicate that the Commission is disinclined to consider public
interest arguments in deciding whether to grant an exemption.
The best example of the Commission's aversion to including pub-
lic interest concerns in its analysis is found in FEDETB.84 The case
concerned a trade association consisting of almost all of the Belgian
and Luxembourgian tobacco manufacturers. The association operated
an extensive distribution system, which fixed profit margins, standard
terms of payment and end-of-year rebates. The association's defense
was that regulation of distribution was necessary to ensure the survival
of specialized tobacco wholesalers and retailers. The Commission re-
jected this argument, however, with little consideration:
Granting [specialized wholesalers and retailers] more favourable condi-
tions "in order to insure their survival".. . can only be interpreted as an
attempt artificially to keep businesses on the market when the ultimate
buyer is not convinced that they are so essential and the normal forces of
competition would have put them out of business.85
The Commission thus relegated survival of these specialized
wholesalers and retailers to the forces of competition, and ultimately to
consumers, instead of to the protective regulations of the association.
The Commission was apparently unwilling to consider that survival of
a large group of retailers could serve the public interest even if compe-
tition is reduced. It did not weigh advantages to the public interest
against disadvantages to consumers such as higher prices. One must,
therefore, conclude that the Commission's refusal to examine the pub-
lic interest defense in detail suggests that it narrowly interprets condi-
tion (a), looking only for benefits to consumers and not to wholesalers,
retailers or their employees.
83 See Mok, Kartelbeleidnu en in de toekomst, NIEUWE ONTWIKKELINGEN IN HET EUROPEES
KARTELRECHT 1 (1976).
84 Re FEDETAB, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 224) 29 (1978).
85 Id. at 43.
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The association's appeal of the Commission's decision in
FEDETAB to the Court of Justice was based partly on the Commis-
sion's refusal to grant an exemption. 6 The association revived its pub-
lic interest defense that the purpose of the distribution system was to
maintain a dense distribution network of 80,000 retailers able to supply
consumers in even the remotest places with a wide range of tobacco
brands. They argued that elimination of the system would have serious
social consequences, including increased bankruptcy of small retailers
and unemployment.8 7 The Court affirmed the Commission,"8 and re-
jected the public interest defense. The Court acknowledged that the
distribution system was responsible for the very large number of small
outlets, each carrying a wide range of brands, but it doubted whether
such benefits would sufficiently compensate for the stringent restric-
tions imposed "on competition in respect of sales terms allowed the
trade."8 9 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the distribution sys-
tem probably did not "contribute... to improving the distribution of
cigarettes within the meaning of Article 85(3). " 90
The Court's treatment of the public interest defense was unsatis-
factory for two reasons. First, it did not squarely address the associa-
tion's claim that elimination of the FEDETAB distribution system
would endanger the survival of the small retailers, and lead to bank-
ruptcies and unemployment. Second, although the Court stated that
the distribution system probably did not contribute to improving the
distribution of cigarettes, it failed to discuss whether the system satis-
fied condition (a) by fostering economic progress.
Although the Court disparaged the public interest defense and
rested its holding on other grounds, the Court did not hold, as the
Commission did, that the defense is invalid. That the Court may later
accept the defense in an appropriate case is consistent with Metro,
where the Court stated:
[Tihe establishment of supply forecasts for a reasonable period constitutes
a stabilizing factor with regard to the provision of employment which,
since it improves the general conditions of production, especially when
the market conditions are unfavourable, comes within the framework of
86 FEDETAB, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, 3275, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R 134, 244.
87 See id. at 3278, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 246.
88 The Court disposed of the case on the grounds that condition (d) was not fulfilled. The
Court pointed out that FEDETAB member firms produce or import roughly 95% of the cigarettes
sold in Belgium and thus were in a position to eliminate competition in respect to a substantial
part of the tobacco market. Id. at 3279-80, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 247-48.
89 Id. at 3279, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 247.
90 Id.
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the objectives to which reference may be had pursuant to Article 85(3). 91
Factors other than the social considerations of avoiding bankrupt-
cies and unemployment may be within the scope of an expanded first
condition of exemption. The Court in the Metro case indicated that
exemption is appropriate for agreements intended to improve the gen-
eral conditions of production. This may mean that the "improvement
of production" requirement of condition (a) is satisfied if the agreement
improves production in the economy generally, even if it does not im-
prove production of the goods involved in the agreement. In addition,
there is a strong argument that the "technical or economic progress"
requirement may be satisfied by any agreement which generates any
kind of progress relevant to the EEC. "Progress" must be defined by
referring to Article 2 of the Treaty, which states that the goals of the
EEC are "to promote throughout the Community a harmonious devel-
opment of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion,
an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living
and closer relations between the States belonging to it."'9 2 The goals
are sufficiently comprehensive to allow the Court to consider social,
environmental and developmental policy in determining whether an
agreement promotes technical or economic progress.93
Even if the Commission interprets condition (a) of exemption so as
to account for considerations other than increased competition and
benefits to customers, agreements restricting competition will still have
to satisfy conditions (b), (c) and (d) to qualify for exemption. The three
other conditions impose standards which preclude exemption of agree-
ments which would have undesirable results for competition and cus-
tomers. Condition (b) requires consumer participation in the benefits
resulting from the restrictive agreement. Because the cases discussed
above interpret condition (a) also to require that the customer benefit,
conditions (a) and (b) may seem identical. The Court, however, has
stated that they are separate requirements,94 and the Commission
should, therefoie, separately examine whether consumers participate in
benefits enumerated in condition (a). This requires a definition of
91 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1916, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 1 8435, at 7856.
92 EEC Treaty, art. 2, supra note 9.
93 Similarly, the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 2, at 3, states that
"These are clearly economic and social aims and it is therefore right and expedient that rules on
competition should be increasingly considered in the light of the economic and social situation."
(emphasis in original).
94 Metro v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1971, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 1 8435, at 7856.
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"consumers."9 Some writers favor a definition including all those not
a party to the agreement.96 However, the Court and Commission have
decided that "consumers" means "users of the product." Conse-
quently, condition (b) requires that consumers receive a benefit beyond
that guaranteed by condition (a) to consumers as part of the economy
as a whole.
Condition (c) provides that the agreement contain only indispen-
sable restrictions. By making overly broad restrictions unlawful, the
condition provides an additional safeguard.
Condition (d) requires that competition in a substantial part of the
products in question not be threatened. The criteria for meeting this
condition, however, are unclear; the Commission has exempted agree-
ments between parties possessing predominant 97 market shares, yet re-
fused to exempt agreements between parties with low98 market shares.
Although a "unified theory" of condition (d) is clearly lacking, such a
theory may be deduced from Geitling v. High Authority,99 a case
brought under an equivalent provision of the the European Coal and
Steel Community Treaty. In that case, the Court of Justice seemed to
imply that the power to eliminate competition in a substantial part of
the product market means the power to affect substantially the price
level in that product market. No EEC decision has adopted this princi-
ple, but none has contradicted it either, and it seems an appropriate
basis for the fourth condition of exemption. This construction would
assure that exempting more agreements by expanding condition (a)
would not substantially increase prices in the relevant market."°°
Thus, a standard of reason in Article 85(3) means that, in order to
benefit from an exemption, an agreement must (a) yield benefits for the
economy as a whole, (b) yield benefits for the customers of the parties
95 In some of the other languages of the EEC Treaty, the corresponding term is "users."
96 See, e.g., Mok, supra note 83.
97 See, eg., National Sulphuric Acid Ass'n, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 260) 24 (1980), [19801
3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429.
98 See, e.g., Re GERO-fabriek, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 8 (1977), [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. D35.
99 1962 E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 83, [1962] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 115. It is interesting to note that
the facts in Geftling are strikingly similar to Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933), which was brought under the United States Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
100 It is subject to dispute whether other means of allowing such agreements exist. One possi-
bility would be a regulation under Article 87(2)(c), which provides for defining, if need be, in the
various branches of the economy, the scope of the provisions of Article 85. EEC Treaty, art.
87(2)(c), supra note 9. Whereas some writers are of the opinion that such regulations should
comply with Article 85(3), eg., Sharpe, The Commission's Proposals on Crisis Cartels, 17 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 75, 82 (1980), it is submitted that this constitutes apetitioprinciii since the applica-
bility of Article 85(3) precisely depends on the scope of Article 85.
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to the agreement, (c) not contain any restrictions beyond what is neces-
sary to achieve these goals, and (d) pose no danger that prices will be
increased in the relevant market.
III. CONCLUSION
The development of EEC antitrust law, which still continues, re-
quires that an equilibrium be found between the need for a sound the-
ory of the antitrust provisions and the need for sound enforcement.
The present emphasis on developing theory has produced unsatisfac-
tory enforcement, fraught with delay and uncertainty. The introduc-
tion of a standard of reason to Article 85(1), which accounts for
interests of the parties to the agreement, brings EEC antitrust law
nearer to the proper equilibrium. The theory is sound because the
Commission ought not to interfere with restrictive practices for which
the parties have valid economic reasons, which are not intended to re-
strict competition, and which are normal in the sense that any reason-
able firm in the same situation would adopt the same restrictions. This
theory of Article 85(1) would solve some of the present enforcement
problems of backlogged exemption requests.
The present theory of Article 85(3) attaches some significance to
the public interest, but should emphasize this interest with greater en-
thusiasm. The Commission should be more receptive to arguments
that a restrictive agreement benefits the economy as a whole by increas-
ing employment or environmental protection, or by meeting any of the
objectives of Article 2. Consumer interests will be adequately pro-
tected by existing requirements that exempted agreements produce
benefits in which consumers participate and which do not increase
prices.
This suggested evolution admittedly reduces the importance of
consumers' and competitors' interests. In the present economic circum-
stances, however, a more balanced theory of competition law is neces-
sary to respond to the valid criticisms of the European Parliament.
